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Conceptual fluency increases
recollection: behavioral and
electrophysiological evidence
Wei Wang, Bingbing Li, Chuanji Gao, Huifang Xu and Chunyan Guo*
Beijing Key Laboratory of Learning and Cognition, Department of Psychology, College of Education, Capital Normal
University, Beijing, China
It is widely established that fluency can contribute to recognition memory. Previous
studies have found that enhanced fluency increases familiarity, but not recollection. The
present study was motivated by a previous finding that conceptual priming affected
recollection. We used event-related potentials to investigate the electrophysiological
correlates of these effects with conceptually related two-character Chinese words. We
found that previous conceptual priming effects on conceptual fluency only increased the
incidence of recollection responses. We also found that enhanced conceptual fluency
was associated with N400 attenuation, which was also correlated with the behavioral
indicator of recollection. These results suggest that the N400 effect might be related to
the impact of conceptual fluency on recollection recognition. These study findings provide
further evidence for the relationship between fluency and recollection.
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Introduction
Dual-process accounts of recognition memory posit that recognition memory performance is
dependent on two distinct memory processes or types of memory, which are often referred to
as recollection and familiarity. Recollection involves the retrieval of more information, such as
contextual details associated with the study episode. In contrast, subjects experience familiarity with
a recognition target when the target cues a feeling of memory, although they recall no additional
confirmatory information (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002). Neuropsychological (Yonelinas et al.,
1998; Aggleton et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2008), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI;
Brown and Aggleton, 2001; Davachi et al., 2003; Ranganath et al., 2004; Diana et al., 2007; Skinner
and Fernandes, 2007), and event-related potential (ERP; for a review, see Rugg and Curran, 2007)
studies have found that recollection and familiarity have distinct neural bases, which provides
strong evidence for dual-process models.
Numerous ERP studies have suggested that familiarity and recollection are indicated by different
ERP components, i.e., the FN400 and late positive component (LPC), respectively (Curran, 2000;
Curran and Cleary, 2003; Mecklinger, 2006; Rugg and Curran, 2007). The FN400 is a negative ERP
deflection with a 300–500ms latency that is largest at frontal scalp locations and is more positive
for old items relative to new items. The LPC is a posterior positive shift potential between 500
and 700ms that is reduced for new items. However, some researchers have argued that FN400
potentials are associated with conceptual priming that co-occurs with familiarity (for a review, see
Paller et al., 2007). For instance, Voss and Paller (2006) found that familiarity could be indicated
by later posterior potentials, but that conceptual priming was associated with frontal potentials
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between 250 and 500ms. Using squiggles as stimuli, Voss
and Paller (2007) first dissociated conceptual implicit memory
from familiarity during a recognition test. They emphasized
that researchers should account for both implicit and explicit
memory in their investigations into certain memory functions.
The controversy over whether FN400 potentials are associated
with familiarity or conceptual priming is related to the argument
about whether FN400 has functional distinctions from N400.
Voss and Federmeier (2011) directly contrasted the FN400 in
recognition memory with the N400 in language and found no
electrophysiological or functional difference. However, Bridger
et al. (2012) argued that the experimental design used by
Voss and Federmeier (2011) confounded recognition with
semantic processes. When confounding factors were avoided,
they found qualitative distinctions between FN400 and N400.
The relationship between FN400 and N400 potentials remains an
open topic.
Bearing implicit and explicit memory in mind, Stenberg
et al. (2009) attempted to isolate conceptual priming from
familiarity to examine the neural correlates of the latter. However,
Lucas et al. (2010) insisted that their research procedures
were problematic, although they had followed the right path.
Indeed, dissociation of these two phenomena is difficult
because the circumstances that produce conceptual fluency often
yield familiarity. For instance, enhanced conceptual fluency
may increase judgments of familiarity (Rajaram and Geraci,
2000; Wolk et al., 2004). In addition, multiple neurocognitive
processes, including perceptual or conceptual fluency, can
contribute to familiarity, and such contributions are dependent
on various testing situations (Lucas et al., 2012; Taylor and
Henson, 2012b; Lucas and Paller, 2013). A broader issue is
involved here, i.e., whether implicit memory (e.g., conceptual
priming) and explicit memory (e.g., recognition) are supported
by multiple systems or a single system. Although abundant
evidence indicates that implicit and explicit memory have distinct
neural bases and rely on separate systems (for reviews, see
Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 2004), some researchers have suggested
that dissociation evidence supporting the multiple-systems
account can also be explained by the single-system account
(Berry et al., 2006, 2008a,b, 2012). The boundary between implicit
and explicit memory may not be clear cut (for a review, see Dew
and Cabeza, 2011).
The remember/know (R/K) paradigm, which is based on
subjective experience or varieties of consciousness, is often
assumed to be a direct way to assess recollection and familiarity.
Tulving (1985) introduced this paradigm in an attempt to
assess whether retrieval occurred from episodic or semantic
memory systems. The recognition memory processes that R
and K responses reflect are debated. According to dual-process
interpretations of the R/K paradigm, R and K responses reflect
two qualitatively different memory processes (for a review, see
Gardiner, 2001), e.g., recollection and familiarity, in recognition
memory (Jacoby et al., 1997). In contrast, the signal detection
theory of the R/K paradigm suggests that the distinction between
R and K responses is quantitative, and that these responses reflect
different confidence levels of memory retrieval (for a review, see
Dunn, 2004).
The relationship between fluency, typically defined as the
speed and ease of processing, and a subjective sense of familiarity,
was first proposed by Jacoby and Dallas (1981), who theorized
that stimuli experienced in the past were processed more fluently
than novel stimuli. Thus, fluency was used as a heuristic in
memory judgments. Accumulating evidence indicates that fluent
stimuli are more likely to be endorsed as having been studied
in a recognition test, and that illusions of recognition can be
elicited by artificially enhancing fluency through priming or
other means (e.g., Jacoby andWhitehouse, 1989; Goldinger et al.,
1999; Whittlesea and Williams, 2001).
For example, in a pioneering study (Jacoby and Whitehouse,
1989), participants performed a word recognition memory test.
In the test phase, presentation of a “context” word preceded the
test words. In comparison with a condition in which no context
word was presented, the probability of old responses was found to
be increased when the context word matched the recognition test
word (for studied and unstudied items). The authors explained
this memory illusion in terms of unconscious influences on an
attribution process. In the absence of awareness of its true source,
participants were likely to erroneously attribute this increased
fluency to the prior study phase. In support of this hypothesis,
when the duration of primes was lengthened or participants were
informed about them, the bias reversed such that primed test cues
were less likely to be called old; this finding is consistent with
participants’ attribution of fluency to the primes, rather than to
the study phase (e.g., Higham and Vokey, 2000; Klinger, 2001;
Higham and Vokey, 2004).
Although Jacoby and Whitehouse’s original findings did not
specifically address the familiarity/recollection distinction, a
subsequent study (Rajaram, 1993) using the “standard” R/K
procedure showed that the recognition bias induced by masked
primes increased only K judgments of studied and unstudied
items. The author attributed this effect of repetition priming
on familiarity to increased perceptual fluency. In a later study,
Rajaram and Geraci (2000) used semantic primes and found
that participants gave significantly more K judgments to items
with related primes than to those with unrelated primes, while
R responses were unaffected. These results suggest that the
familiarity signal arises at the level of conceptual fluency.
According to dual-process theories of recognition memory,
familiarity is dependent on remembering specific items that
are not associated with specific contextual markers, whereas
recollection is dependent on remembering an association
between an item and probably variable markers of the context
in which it was encountered (for a review, see Yonelinas, 2002).
Thus, subliminal priming could selectively enhance familiarity
because it increases the fluency with which item representations,
but not item-context representations, are activated. Substantial
evidence suggests that fluency manipulations disproportionately
influence familiarity, as opposed to recollection (Rajaram and
Geraci, 2000; Miller et al., 2008; Woollams et al., 2008).
In a recent study, Taylor and Henson (2012a) used
semantically related primes that were not associatively related
in an attempt to isolate the effect of conceptual fluency on
recognition memory judgments. When they included these
conceptual primes with the standard repetition primes (with
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different blocks for each prime type), they found crossover
interaction between prime type (conceptual vs. repetition) and
memory judgment (R vs. K) on the priming effect: repetition
primes increased K but not R judgments, and conceptual primes
increased R but not K judgments. In an fMRI study, Taylor
et al. (2013) replicated the previous behavioral finding that
conceptual priming increased R judgments, and they found
converging evidence for increased activity following conceptual
primes in brain regions associated with recollection. Because the
conceptual priming effect was not observed when participants
were exposed only to conceptual primes, Taylor and Henson
(2012a) posited that exposure to repetition primes might be a
critical factor for conceptual fluency to increase R judgments.
They proposed a “true recollection hypothesis” to explain the
effect of conceptual priming on R hits in the fMRI study (Taylor
et al., 2013).
However, neither repetition nor conceptual priming produced
whole-brain effects in their study, which may have been due to
the relative insensitivity of blood oxygen level–dependent signals
to transient effects, such as very briefly presented masked primes.
Thus, they were not able to compare neural correlates of these
priming effects directly, as should be possible with ERPs because
of their high temporal resolution. ERPs have been used widely
to investigate the neural correlates of the masked priming effect
during lexical decision tasks. Studies using the masked-repetition
priming paradigm have shown that an earlier priming effect
around the latency of P200 and a later priming effect around
the latency of N400 are related to masked-repetition priming
effects (e.g., Misra and Holcomb, 2003; Holcomb and Grainger,
2006). Studies using the Jacoby and Whitehouse paradigm in
combination with ERPs have also been conducted to examine
the electrophysiological correlates of fluency’s contribution to
recognition memory. For example, Woollams et al. (2008)
found that masked repetition priming was associated with a
central-focused ERP effect between 150 and 250ms, and a
posteriorly distributed ERP effect between 300 and 500ms.
However, Lucas et al. (2012) found only the posterior N400
ERP effect using the same paradigm. These two studies could
not distinguish the electrophysiological correlates of perceptual
and conceptual fluency because they used the masked-repetition
priming paradigm. By investigating the electrophysiological
correlates of masked conceptual priming, we could obtain the
electrophysiological correlates of “true” conceptual fluency and
investigate how it contributes to recognition memory.
In the current study, we used conceptually related two-
character Chinese word pairs to investigate the effect of
conceptual fluency on recognition memory in combination with
electroencephalographic (EEG) recordings. In the study phase,
participants were asked to perform an “interestingness” judgment
task. In the test phase, half of the test words were conceptually
primed (preceded by conceptually related words, here termed
MCP trials) and half were unprimed (preceded by unrelated
words, here termed MUP trials). Because the primes and targets
had different perceptual features and were not associatively
related, i.e., the targets were impossible free associates of the
primes, any effect of MCPs could be attributed to conceptual
fluency.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Sixteen subjects (aged 20–26 years; 11 females) participated
in the experiment. All were right handed and reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Each subject signed an
informed consent form and received monetary compensation.
This research was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee at Capital Normal University.
Materials
The stimuli consisted of 600 two-character Chinese word pairs
that were conceptually related but not lexically associated (see
Supplementary Material). Conceptual relatedness was defined
according to the criteria of Taylor and Henson (2012a). Twenty-
six college students evaluated conceptual relatedness and lexical
association. Conceptual relatedness of each word pair was rated
using a 10-point scale (10 = highly conceptually related, 1 = no
conceptual relatedness). The forward and backward associations
of each word pair were rated using a 10-point scale (10 =
strongly lexical association, 1 = no lexical association). The
mean conceptual relatedness score was 9.16. The mean scores
of forward and backward association were 2.57 and 2.58. Mean
strokes of primes and targets (sum of the two characters) were
16.9 and 17.1, respectively. Mean word frequencies of primes and
targets were 53 per million and 51 per million, respectively. The
frequency and number of strokes were matched in the MCP and
MUP conditions. The old/new status and MCP/MUP status of
the targets and primes were counterbalanced across participants.
An additional 25 word pairs were used in filler trials. All items
were presented in white against a black background.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of five study-test blocks. In each study
phase, 60 words were presented in random order, bounded
by filler words (two primacy buffers and two recency buffers,
ignored in the analysis). The participants were instructed to
perform an “interestingness” judgment task by pressing one of
two buttons to indicate whether or not the word was interesting.
In each test phase, the participants completed a recognition
test in which 60 old words from the previous study phase were
intermixed with 60 new words. Half of the trials in each test
phase were MCP (i.e., an old or new word that was preceded
by the masked presentation of a conceptually related word), and
the remaining were MUP (i.e., an old or new word that was
preceded by the masked presentation of an unrelated word). One
forward mask (@@) and one backward mask (@@) sandwiched
each prime word in the test phase. The participants were not
informed about the presence of the masked words; they were told
only that the forward mask symbols were used to “prompt” the
appearance of the test words. It was emphasized that participants
needed to focus on the test words to achieve the best memory
performance.
Each study trial began with a fixation cross, followed by the
display of a word for 306ms and then a fixation cross. The
interstimulus interval (ISI) was randomized to be between 1506
and 2000ms. The test phase followed the study phase in each
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block, after a 30-s break during which the participants counted
backward by threes. Each test phase was preceded by two practice
trials (with one new and one old filler word; data not included
in analyses). Each test trial began with the presentation of a
fixation cross for a randomized duration of 1506–2506ms; a
forward mask was then presented for 506ms, followed by the
presentation of a conceptually related or unrelated word for
35ms and then a backward mask for 35ms. Next, a test word
was presented for 506ms, followed by a fixation cross (Figure 1).
The participants were instructed to indicate using button presses
whether they remembered seeing the test word (R judgment),
whether the word was familiar (K judgment), or whether the
word had not appeared in the previous study phase. Speed and
accuracy of responses were emphasized. Note that we used the
label “familiar,” rather than the traditionally “know” judgment,
which was consistent with the terms used by Taylor and Henson
(2012a). Recollection was defined as participants’ retrieval of
any contextual details from the study phase accomplished by
recognition of a stimulus, such as recalling the “interestingness”
judgment of the word or any other details from the learning
episode (e.g., feelings about the word). Familiarity was defined
as participants’ belief that they had encountered the word
previously, with no accompanying contextual detail.
Before the formal experiment, participants practiced
distinguishing between recollection and familiarity in two short
practice blocks, each of which contained 20 study and 40 test
trials. To make sure that they had fully and correctly understood
the instructions, participants were asked to report how R or
Familiar judgments were made in some practice test trials. In
particular, the experimenter ensured that participants did not
equate R/Familiar responses with high/low confidence ratings.
For example, they were instructed that a familiarity response was
appropriate when they were sure (had high confidence) that the
item had been presented in the study phase, but could recall no
contextual detail.
After the five study-test blocks, participants were questioned
about their awareness of the prime words. Only two of the 16
participants reported that they noticed words were presented
between the “prompt” and the following test word in fewer than
five trials in a test block, and that they were unrelated to the test
word.
Electrophysiological Recording and Analyses
ERPs were extracted from scalp EEG recordings from 62
Ag/AgCl electrodes embedded in an elastic cap. The electrode
locations adhered to the extended international 10–20 system.
The left mastoid was used as the reference site online. Signals
were re-referenced oﬄine to averaged mastoids. EEGs were
recorded with a band pass of 0.05–100Hz (0.05–40Hz filtered
oﬄine), and sampled at a rate of 500Hz. Impedance was less
than 5 k. Each 1000-ms averaging epoch began 100ms prior
to stimulus onset. Baseline corrections were performed using
mean pre–stimulus onset amplitudes. Trials exceeding ±75µV
were rejected. EOG blink artifacts were corrected using a
linear regression estimate. Repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) included Greenhouse-Geisser correction
when necessary and Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc pairwise
comparisons. The alpha level was 0.05.
Results
Behavioral Results
The mean percentages of responses under each condition are
presented in Table 1. For studied items, correct recognition
included R hits and K hits. Responses to unstudied items were
classified as false alarms (FAs) or correct rejections (CRs). The
overall accuracy, computed as Pr (the proportion of hits minus
the proportion of FAs, averaged acrossMCP andMUP trials), was
0.39 for R judgments and 0.27 for K judgments. For both types of
recognition response, the accuracy was reliably greater than zero
[t(15) = 15.464, p < 0.001 for R judgments; t(15) = 9.688, p <
0.001 for K judgments], indicating that memory was reflected to
a degree greater than chance.
To formally assess masked conceptual priming, a 2 (study
status: studied/unstudied)× 2 (response type: R/K)× 2 (masked
conceptual priming: MCP/MUP) ANOVA was performed for
the percentage of old responses. Three-way interaction among
study status, response type, and masked conceptual priming was
significant [F(1, 15) = 8.993, p = 0.009,MSE= 0.001].
Next, ANOVAs were performed for hits and FAs, respectively.
A 2 (response type: R/K) × 2 (masked conceptual priming:
MCP/MUP) ANOVA was performed for the hit rate. The
interaction of response type withmasked conceptual priming was
significant [F(1, 15) = 6.395, p = 0.023, MSE = 0.001]. Simple
effect analysis revealed a significant difference between MCP and
MUP data only for R responses [F(1, 15) = 7.277, p = 0.017,
MSE= 0.001].
The FA rate was analyzed similarly. The main effect of
response type was significant [F(1, 15) = 40.977, p < 0.001,
MSE = 0.003], and the interaction of response type with masked
conceptual priming was also significant [F(1, 15) = 6.029, p =
0.027, MSE = 0.0003]. Simple effect analysis revealed that there
was only a significant difference between MCP and MUP on the
K responses [F(1, 15) = 5.199, p = 0.038,MSE= 0.0005].
Overall, the masked conceptual priming effect selectively
affected R hits and K FAs.
ERP Results
Analysis of the ERP results included three steps. First, ERPs
from the test phase were analyzed without consideration of
masked conceptual priming to determine ERP differences among
R hits, K hits, and CRs. Second, to investigate the masked
conceptual priming effects, we collapsed ERPs across response
type and old/new status to examine overall differences between
MCP and MUP trials. Third, masked conceptual priming effects
were investigated across the three response types (R hit/K
hit/CR).
Based on previous research on recognition memory and
conceptual fluency (Paller et al., 2007; Lucas et al., 2012; Hou
et al., 2013) and our observation of the results, the ERP
amplitudes were averaged for three midline electrode clusters
(frontal, F3/Fz/F4; central, C3/Cz/C4; parietal, P3/Pz/P4).
Basic Memory Effects
For the analysis of basic memory effects, a priori time windows
of 300–500 and 500–700ms were selected according to previous
research (e.g., MacKenzie and Donaldson, 2007; Voss and Paller,
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the experiment, showing
examples of the stimuli. In the study phase, participants performed
an “interestingness” judgment task. The test-phase task was to make
recognition judgments. (A) In masked conceptual priming (MCP) trials,
an old or new word was preceded by masked presentation of a
conceptually related word. (B) In masked unprimed (MUP) trials, an old
or new word was preceded by masked presentation of an unrelated
word.
2007). These windows are fairly standard for the examination of
FN400 and parietal old/new effects, respectively (Figure 2). The
mean numbers of artifact-free epochs per condition were 120 for
R hits, 110 for K hits, and 247 for CRs.
For the 300–500ms interval, a 3 × 3 ANOVA was performed
with factors response type (R hit/K hit/CR) and cluster
(frontal/central/parietal). The main effect of response type was
significant [F(2, 30) = 9.44, p = 0.001, MSE = 2.065]. The
interaction of response type and cluster was not significant
[F(4, 60) = 0.805, p = 0.456, MSE = 0.359]. Pairwise
comparisons across the three conditions revealed significantly
more positive amplitudes for R hits and K hits relative to CRs
(p = 0.005 and 0.022, respectively), with no significant difference
between R hits and K hits (p = 0.859).
For the 500–700ms interval, a 3 × 3 ANOVA was performed
with factors response type (R hit/K hit/CR) and cluster
(frontal/central/parietal). The main effect of response type was
significant [F(2, 30) = 7.078, p = 0.007, MSE = 8.609]. The
interaction of response type and cluster was not significant
[F(4, 60) = 2.367, p = 0.108,MSE = 0.507]. Pairwise comparisons
across the three conditions revealed significantly more positive
amplitudes for R hits relative to CRs (p = 0.021) and K hits
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TABLE 1 | Mean percentage of responses in each condition.
Remember Know New
Studied Conceptually primed 42.9 (2.7) 38.1 (2.4) 18.8 (1.8)
Unprimed 40.6 (2.6) 39.1 (2.7) 20.1 (1.7)
Unstudied Conceptually primed 2.4 (0.6) 12.3 (1.8) 85.2 (2.2)
Unprimed 2.7 (0.6) 10.5 (1.6) 86.6 (2.0)
SE in parentheses.
FIGURE 2 | ERPs related to recollection and familiarity. ERPs related to
recollection (R hits), familiarity (K hits), and correct rejections (CRs), collapsed
across masked priming conditions. (A) Waveforms for each condition from
frontal and parietal electrodes are shown. (B) Topographical plots depict ERP
differences between K hits and CRs (left) and between R hits and CRs (right).
(p = 0.042), with no significant difference between K hits and
CRs (p = 0.3).
Masked Conceptual Priming Effects
First, the differences between MCP and MUP trials were
investigated. The mean numbers of artifact-free epochs per
condition were 282 for MCP trials and 285 for MUP trials.
Amplitudes from 300 to 500ms were more positive for
MCP than for MUP trials (Figure 3), which is consistent
with the typical latency of N400 (Kutas and Federmeier,
2011).
For the 300–500ms interval, a 2 × 3 ANOVA was performed
with factors masked conceptual priming (MCP/MUP) and
cluster (frontal/central/parietal). The main effect of masked
conceptual priming was significant [F(1, 15) = 19.07, p = 0.001,
MSE = 1.317]. The interaction of masked conceptual priming
FIGURE 3 | ERP correlates of MCP and MUP test words. ERPs to test
words preceded by masked conceptually primes (MCP) and masked unrelated
primes (MUP). (A) Waveforms from frontal and parietal electrodes are shown.
(B) A topographical plot depicts ERP differences between MCP and MUP
words.
and cluster was not significant [F(2, 30) = 0.99, p = 0.352,MSE=
0.181].
For the 500–700ms interval, a similar 2 × 3 ANOVA was
conducted. The main effect of masked conceptual priming was
not significant [F(1, 15) = 0.042, p = 0.84, MSE = 1.392]. The
interaction of masked conceptual priming and cluster was not
significant [F(2, 30) = 0.055, p = 0.894,MSE= 0.14].
This priming effect was similar across the three response types
(Figure 4). For each interval, a 2 × 3 × 3 ANOVA with factors
masked conceptual priming (MCP/MUP), response type (R hit/K
hit/CR), and cluster (frontal/central/parietal) was conducted. The
mean numbers of artifact-free trials for R hits, K hits, and CRs
were 62, 54, and 122, respectively, for MCP trials, and 58, 56, and
125, respectively, for MUP trials.
For the 300–500ms interval, the main effects of masked
conceptual priming and response type were significant [F(1, 15) =
13.436, p = 0.002, MSE = 6.732; F(2, 30) = 9.219, p = 0.001,
MSE = 4.039, respectively], the main effect of cluster was not
significant [F(2, 30) = 0.286, p = 0.613, MSE = 83.48]. The
interaction of masked conceptual priming and response type was
not significant [F(2, 30) = 0.701, p = 0.49, MSE = 1.743],
the interaction of masked conceptual priming and cluster was
not significant [F(2, 30) = 0.951, p = 0.368, MSE = 0.738],
the interaction of response type and cluster was not significant
[F(4, 60) = 0.87, p = 0.43, MSE = 0.712], and the three-way
interaction was not significant [F(4, 60) = 0.074, p = 0.953,
MSE= 0.523].
For the 500–700ms interval, the main effects of masked
conceptual priming and cluster were not significant [F(1, 15) =
0.254, p = 0.622, MSE = 5.405; F(2, 30) = 0.402, p = 0.55,
MSE= 73.817, respectively], but the main effect of response type
was significant [F(2, 30) = 7.061, p = 0.007, MSE = 17.012].
The interaction of masked conceptual priming and response type
was not significant [F(2, 30) = 2.062, p = 0.159, MSE = 4.757],
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FIGURE 4 | Similarity of masked conceptual priming effects across three response types. ERPs for R hits, K hits, and correct rejection trials as a function of
MCP vs. MUP status. Waveforms from frontal and parietal electrodes are shown.
the interaction of masked conceptual priming and cluster was
not significant [F(2, 30) = 0.094, p = 0.873, MSE = 0.764],
the interaction of response type and cluster was not significant
[F(4, 60) = 2.477, p = 0.097, MSE = 1.024], and the three-way
interaction was not significant [F(4, 60) = 0.924, p = 0.421,
MSE= 0.752].
In complementary across-participant correlation analyses,
we found that behavioral masked priming effects on R hits
were related to N400 differences. This result provided tentative
evidence for a connection between conceptual fluency–related
ERPs and R responses. Many studies have used correlational
analyses to examine associations between ERPs and behavior
(e.g., Voss and Paller, 2006; Voss et al., 2010; Lucas et al., 2012)
or among different ERP components (e.g., Meyer et al., 2007).
Behavioral measures of masked priming effects were computed
as: MCP R/K hits minus MUP R/K hits. ERP correlates of
masked priming effects were calculated as the average amplitude
differences of three electrode clusters between MCP and MUP
trials from 300 to 500ms. Across-participant correlations were
thus computed between each behavioral measure of the masked
priming effect separately for R hits andK hits, and ERP difference
measures. For R hits, the behavioral measure of the masked
priming effects was significantly correlated with the MCP /MUP
amplitude difference (n = 16, r = 0.506, p = 0.046; Figure 5).
For K hits, no significant correlation was found (n = 16,
r = 0.307, p = 0.248).
Discussion
The present study manipulated the conceptual fluency of
recognition test cues and investigated the relationships between
electrophysiological correlates of masked conceptual priming–
induced fluency and recognition. Behavioral results indicated
that the masked conceptual priming effect affected R hits, rather
FIGURE 5 | Across-participant correlation between behavioral effect
and ERPs difference. Across-participant correlation between behavioral
masked conceptual priming effect on R hits and difference in ERPs from 300
to 500ms for MCP trials relative to MUP trials.
than K hits. A typical N400 effect was found when we compared
the neural correlates of MCP and MUP items. In addition,
across-participant correlation analyses revealed a significant
relationship between the priming N400 effect and the priming
effect on recognition memory for R hits, but not for K hits,
suggesting that the N400 effects might be related to the effect
of conceptual fluency on recollection. According to the fluency
attribution account of recognition, these results suggest that
recollection can be induced by conceptual fluency, which was
derived from masked conceptual priming.
The results of our behavioral analysis replicated the key
finding of Taylor and Henson (2012a) that masked conceptual
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priming could increase R hits. Importantly, participants in our
experiment were exposed only to conceptual primes. In two
previous studies (Taylor and Henson, 2012a; Taylor et al., 2013),
the conceptual priming effect was observed only when conceptual
and repetition primes occurred in the same experiment. Because
they did not observe the conceptual priming effect in experiments
that used only conceptual primes, Taylor and Henson (2012a)
assumed that exposure to repetition primes might be a critical
factor for conceptual priming effects on recollection. Taylor
et al. (2013) proposed a “true” recollection account based on
two critical findings: first, brain regions associated with genuine
recollection were more active for conceptually primed trials than
for unprimed trials; and second, the increase in R judgments
following conceptual primes occurred only for studied items, but
not for unstudied items.
We believe that our findings provide better support for
the fluency-attribution account. First, in terms of the fluency-
attribution framework, “old” responses are increased for more
fluent (primed) items, irrespective of study status (e.g., Jacoby
and Whitehouse, 1989; Rajaram, 1993). In other words, fluency
manipulation tends to increase both hits and FAs. In the present
study, masked conceptual priming increased not only R hits, but
also K FAs. Second, the observed association between conceptual
priming and N400-like ERP potentials also provides better
support for the fluency-attribution account than for the “true”
recollection account. These findings suggest that the mechanism
behind these effects was processing fluency.
Intriguingly, we found conceptual priming effects on
recollection that Taylor and Henson (2012a) did not find when
only conceptual prime blocks were used, although we used
a similar paradigm. We contend that memory performance
might play a key role in this difference. Compared with their
findings, our sample showed higher overall accuracy, but a lower
recollection ratio, which might lead to distinct fluency effects
on recollection. Another possible reason for the discrepancy in
results is our use of different stimuli (Chinese words vs. English
words in Taylor and Henson, 2012a). Further studies should be
conducted to investigate this phenomenon in greater depth.
Most studies of the relationship between conceptual fluency
and recognition memory have provided support for the influence
of conceptual fluency on familiarity (Rajaram and Geraci, 2000;
Wolk et al., 2004). In addition, a nearly ubiquitous complication
of the use of the R/K paradigm to distinguish recollection from
familiarity is that it can be very difficult to tell whether R and
K responses are used merely to separate strong memories from
weak memories, or whether participants actually map them onto
experiences of recollection and familiarity per se. R responses
may have been confounded to some extent by familiarity in
the present study. These concerns could be alleviated by the
following two points. First, when providing instructions, the
experimenter emphasized clearly that participants could not
equate R/Familiar responses with high/low confidence ratings.
To ensure that they understood these instructions correctly,
participants were asked to report the reasons for R and K
responses in the practice blocks. Some studies have suggested that
such instructions help to prevent participants from confusing
R/K instructions with confidence instructions (Yonelinas, 2001;
Rotello et al., 2005; Yonelinas and Parks, 2007). Second, in the
analysis of basic memory effects, ERP differences between K
hits and CRs emerged in the 300–500ms interval, and those
between R hits and CRs emerged in both intervals. These results
suggest that the timing of neural activity associated with R and K
responses differs. Therefore, R responses obtained in the present
study should reflect recollection.
When we collapsed ERPs across response type and old/new
status to examine masked conceptual priming effects, a typical
N400 effect was obtained. Amplitudes from 300 to 500ms
were more positive for MCP than for MUP trials. This effect
was found in most previous studies investigating the effect of
masked repetition priming on recognition (Woollams et al., 2008;
Lucas et al., 2012). More broadly, studies investigating masked
repetition-priming effects also identified a similar N400 effect
(Deacon et al., 2000; Holcomb and Grainger, 2006). However,
whether masked conceptual (semantic) priming elicits such an
N400 effect remains under debate. For instance, some studies
(Kiefer, 2002; Kiefer and Brendel, 2006) obtained the N400 effect
when investigating masked semantic (conceptual) priming. In
contrast, Brown and Hagoort (1993) observed a significant N400
effect under the unmasked, but not the masked, presentation
condition. The results of the present study support the idea that
masked conceptual priming can induce N400 effects. Moreover,
these N400 semantic priming effects were dependent on the
activation of primes, although they were subliminal.
This priming effect was similar across the three response
types (R hit/K hit/CR). In addition, across-participant correlation
analyses found that participants who showed larger N400
differences between MCP and MUP trials also showed greater
increases in R hits for MCP compared with MUP trials. These
results suggest that the N400 effect was associated with the
contribution of conceptual fluency to recollection recognition.
However, some scholars have suggested that familiarity and
recollection are correlated with the FN400 old/new effect and
LPC, respectively (e.g., Rugg and Curran, 2007), whereas other
researchers have argued that FN400 potentials are associated
with conceptual priming (e.g., Paller et al., 2007). To reconcile
this controversy, one can resort to the relationship between
recognition memory and fluency (Lucas et al., 2012; Lucas
and Paller, 2013). For example, FN400 potentials may reflect
a conceptual fluency–related precursor to familiarity (Lucas
et al., 2012). Further investigations should be done to examine
the relationship between conceptual fluency and recognition
memory.
Most previous studies have suggested that conceptual fluency
can give rise to familiarity. For example, a series of studies
by Wang and colleagues (Wang et al., 2010, 2014; Wang
and Yonelinas, 2012a,b) showed that the conceptual fluency
induced by conceptual priming can result in the feeling
of familiarity. Moreover, some studies have suggested that
familiarity judgments can also stem from the perceptual fluency
induced by perceptual priming (e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Lucas
and Paller, 2013). However, the results of the present study
suggest that conceptual fluency is related to recollection. These
findings indicate that the contribution of fluency to recognition
is complex and not necessarily characterized by one-to-one
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correlation between the types of fluency and the types of
recognition process. Thus, additional studies are needed to
identify factors that determine how fluency translates into
recognition under various testing conditions.
Many years ago, Mayes et al. (1997) proposed that experiences
of recollection could result partially from the attribution of
fluency to prior experience. They posited that one could
readily confuse an imagined with a remembered item-context
association. However, a variety of factors can affect the extent to
which a given amount of fluency is attributed to and experienced
as recollection, which requires further study. We cannot rule out
the possibility that conceptual priming effects may be “artifacts”
of the binary (either/or) nature of the R/K procedure. In other
words, one might not expect to find such an effect if one used
the parallel R/K ratings procedure (Higham and Vokey, 2004;
Kurilla and Westerman, 2008; Brown and Bodner, 2011), added
a third option (e.g., guesses, Tunney and Fernie, 2007), allowed
indication of different types of recollection (e.g., internal vs.
external source), or minimized recollection using the modified
R/K procedure (e.g., Montaldi et al., 2006). Taken together, these
concerns require new, robust evidence provided by behavioral
and neural data.
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